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LIMITING A LIMITLESS DEFENSE: A CASE
FOR REVIVING THE STATE SECRETS
PROTECTION ACT
ANDREw BURTLESS*
"Let me say it as clearly as I can: Transparency and the rule of law
will be the touchstones of this presidency."
"According to the government's theory, the judiciary should
effectively cordon off all secret government actions from judicial
scrutiny, immunizing the CIA and its partners from the demands
and limits of the law." 2
ABSTRACT
Following President Obama's repeated pledges to bolster
governmental transparency, Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr.
issued guidelines to limit the government's use of an extraordinary
evidentiary privilege to dismiss lawsuits that could expose secret
information: the state secrets privilege.
Yet, halfway through the Obama administration's first term,
the government has asserted an even more potent version of the
privilege to foreclose the litigation of constitutional and human
rights violations. Lacking any clear standards or procedures for
balancing the conflicting needs of injured parties with the
protection of governmental secrets, federal judges have made ad
hoc determinations when handling sensitive information.
Unguided decisions ultimately jeopardize valid state secrets, deny
justice for deserving litigants, and invite time-consuming appeals
in a growing field of litigation concerning controversial clandestine
anti-terrorism efforts.
I argue that Congress should revive and pass the State
Secrets Protection Act to establish a set of uniform court
procedures and standards for judges to assess the privilege's

* The author received his B.A. in English from Carleton College and his
J.D. from City University of New York School of Law in 2011. He would like
to thank Professor Andrea McArdle for her generous assistance and Professor
Franklin Siegel for his encouragement.
1. Remarks of President Barack Obama to White House Senior Staff, 12
DAILY COMP. PRES. DoC. 2 (Jan. 21, 2009).
2. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 579 F.3d 943, 955 (9th Cir. 2009)
(describing the government's use of the privilege during President Obama's
tenure in office).
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impact upon litigation. Passage of the Act will ensure that the
privilege will be used only as it was originally conceived by the
Court: a limited evidentiary privilege. By clarifying that the
privilege may be invoked after discovery and requiring the use of
evidentiary substitutes whenever possible, the act minimizes the
risk that the mere assertion of the privilege will result in a
wrongful dismissal of the case at the onset of litigation. Although
some commentators have argued that administrative mechanisms
like FISA should serve as a model for resolving such claims,
FISA's many weaknesses make it an unattractive model for
reform. Applying the proposed Act to a recent case demonstrates
the various ways in which the statutory standards would
represent an improvement over the privilege's current form.
I.

INTRODUCTION

On the first full day of office, President Obama issued a
sweeping pledge to introduce a new era of governmental
accountability and transparency. For voters enticed by a platform
of change, the promise echoed repeated pledges made along the
campaign trail to rein in broad assertions of executive power.
Specifically, the Bush administration's reliance upon the state
secrets privilege ("privilege")-an evidentiary privilege which bars
military and state secrets from disclosure in judicial proceedingsto dismiss suits against the government was cited as part of "[tihe
problem" on the Obama campaign website.3 One year into
President Obama's term in office, Attorney General Eric H.
Holder, Jr. unveiled a new "state secrets policy" ("Guidelines") for
the purposes of initiating a more sparing invocation of the
defense. 4 Yet, under the Obama administration, the government
has continued to regularly assert the privilege to dismiss suits. 5
3. "The Bush administration has ignored public disclosure rules and has
invoked a legal tool known as the 'state secrets' privilege more than any other
previous administration to get cases thrown out of civil court." ORGANIZING
FOR AMERICA, http://www.barackobama.com/issues/ethics/index-campaign.php
(last visited Mar. 8, 2011).
4. Memorandum from the Office of the U.S. Att'y Gen. to the Heads of
Exec. Dep'ts & Agencies & Heads of Dep't Components 1 (Sept. 23, 2009)
[hereinafter Guidelines], available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents
/state-secret-privileges.pdf ("The Department is adopting these policies and
procedures to strengthen public confidence that the U.S. Government will
invoke the privilege in court only when genuine and significant harm to
national defense or foreign relations is at stake and only to the extent
necessary to safeguard those interests.").
5. See Brief for the United States at 51-52, Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. United
States, Nos. 09-1298, 09-130 (U.S. Dec. 13, 2010) (arguing that state secrets
privilege should preclude a government contractor from bringing suit against
the government); Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction
and Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 43-59, AlAulaqi v. Barack H. Obama, No. 10-cv-1469(JDB) (D.D.C. Sept. 25, 2010)
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Since the Court's last meaningful articulation of the
privilege's scope sixty years ago,6 the emergence of multi-national
have
and online whistleblowers
terrorist organizations
significantly altered the nature and scope of the government's
secrets. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, the government launched a series of aggressive counterterrorism measures characterized by extraordinary stealth and
secrecy.7 Not surprisingly, the government defended many of these
controversial clandestine operations by relying upon the privilege.
While many of these secret programs have been substantially
curtailed, the recent release of diplomatic cables by WikiLeaks has
reinvigorated calls for legal reforms to safeguard confidential
governmental information.8 Yet, despite these noteworthy
developments and numerous opportunities, the Supreme Court
has consistently declined to update the outdated standards used to
scrutinize governmental assertions of secrecy. 9 Without clear
(arguing that the states secrets privilege forecloses litigation of plaintiffs legal
claims contesting the President's ability to kill an American citizen residing
abroad); Public Unclassified Brief for the Government Appellees at 25-40,
Jewel v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, Nos. 10-15616, 10-15638 (9th Cir. Oct. 15, 2010)
(arguing the privilege must result in dismissing a lawsuit regarding a
governmental warrantless wiretapping program); Brief for the Appellees at
16-41, Tennebaum v. Ashcroft, No. 09-1992 (6th Cir. Dec. 2, 2009) (arguing
that the government's previous use of the privilege to preclude litigation was
correct); Redacted, Unclassified Brief for United States on Rehearing En Banc
at 28, Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., No. 08-15693 (9th Cir. Nov. 13,
2009) (arguing that the privilege required dismissal of action under Alien Tort
Statute); Brief for the Appellant at 21-22, Horn v. Huddle, No. 09-5311 (D.C.
Cir. Sept. 24, 2009) (arguing that the district court misapplied the privilege
too narrowly to grant opposing counsel access to protected records); Brief for
the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Mohawk
Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter at 28, No. 08-678 (U.S. July 13, 2009) (arguing
that the privilege implicates interest of constitutional significance under the
separation of powers, thereby qualifying under the collateral order doctrine).
6. See generally United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953) (holding that
the privilege applied to Air Force Report of fatal accident).
7. Within six days of the attacks, President Bush signed a secret executive
order authorizing "extraordinary rendition"; the transfer of terrorist suspects
to countries that are known to use torture as an interrogation tactic.
Beginning in March 2002, the CIA opened numerous hidden detention centers
to hold hundreds of terrorist suspects. Congress also expanded the
government's ability to engage in surveillance through the passage of the USA
Patriot Act. FREDERICK A.O. SCHWARZ, JR. AND AZIZ Z. HUQ, UNCHECKED AND
UNBALANCED: PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN A TIME OF TERROR 97, 101, 125 (The

New Press 2008).
8. Shortly after the WikiLeaks release, Congress began consideration of a
bill to amend the Espionage Act of 1917 to criminalize the knowing
dissemination of "any classified information. . . concerning the human
intelligence activities" that would be "prejudicial to the safety or interest of the
United States." Securing Human Intelligence and Enforcing Lawful
Dissemination Act, H.R. 6506, 111th Cong. (2010).
9. In May 2011, the Supreme Court declined to hear the appeal of a
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guidance on the proper procedures and benchmarks for assessing
the privilege's impact upon litigation, uncertainty is likely to
prevail in the growing field of litigation involving allegedly secret
governmental information.
The recent transformation of the privilege from a rarelyasserted response to a specific discovery request into a frequentlyinvoked doctrine of governmental immunity at the onset of
litigation raises serious concerns relating to the division of
authority between co-equal branches of government.10 Even at the
height of the Cold War-characterized by massive covert military
operations-the privilege occupied a relatively minor role in
governmental legal defenses. Today, the privilege is invoked
regularly," often foreclosing all relief for plaintiffs alleging injury
sustained from private or governmental actors.12 With an outdated
narrowly decided Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision involving the
privilege. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan,Inc., 579 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2009),
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2442 (2011). Although another recent case presented an
opportunity for the Supreme Court to clarify acceptable procedures and
standards for evaluating the privilege, the Court refrained from doing so. See
Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1900 (2011) (No. 09-1298)
(holding that when a plaintiffs civil case against the government would
disclose state secrets, the claim may not be heard by the court). A quote from
Justice Antonin Scalia in the oral argument for that case illustrates the
Supreme Court's deferential approach towards governmental assertions of the
privilege. "We don't know what the state-secrets thing is. The government is
entitled to-to make that determination, so we don't know who's in the right
here." Transcript of Oral Argument at 21 Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. United
States, 131 S. Ct. 1900 (2011) (No. 09-1298).
10. See, e.g., LouIs FISHER, IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY:
UNCHECKED PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE REYNOLDS CASE 262 (University
Press of Kansas 2006) (describing the author's concern that the judiciary's
response to state secrets issues suggest that judges are either intimidated by
these issues or favor the executive branch); Amanda Frost, The State Secrets
Privilege and Separationof Powers, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1931 (2007) (arguing
that the judiciary should ensure the executive branch is being held
accountable for all challenged conduct before deferring to the political
branches); William G. Weaver & Robert M. Pallitto, State Secrets and
Executive Power, 120 POL. SCl. Q. 85, 90 (2005) (describing how judicial
oversight of executive action is difficult and how the state secrets privilege
was asserted in several cases).
11. From 1953 until 1976 the government only invoked the privilege four
times in reported decisions. Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 10, at 101. Between
1977 and 2001 courts made decisions on the state secrets privilege in fifty-one
reported cases. Id. A search of publicized court records via Westlaw indicates
that the government has maintained a historically high reliance upon the
privilege under a new administration-invoking the privilege in at least seven
cases since the Obama administration took office two years ago. See supra
note 5 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 313 (4th Cir. 2007)
(holding that dismissal of a litigant's complaint under the Fifth Amendment
and the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) was proper because it could not be litigated
without threatening the disclosure of state secrets); Terkel v. AT&T Corp., 441
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test for assessing the privilege's impact upon a cause of action, and
faced with the daunting prospect of overstepping separations of
have adopted
powers,' 3 courts
constitutionally-delegated
unpredictable and ad hoc responses.14 Although there have been
various suggested legal reforms to prevent future misapplications
of the privilege,' 5 the most practical solution has already been
considered twice by both houses of Congress. Congress must
reconsider and pass the State Secrets Protection Act' 6 (SSPA) to
provide necessary clarification to federal courts seeking to
determine the proper limitations of a seemingly limitless defense.
Part II discusses the privilege's purpose and a host of policy
considerations supporting procedures requiring the privilege to be
applied more narrowly. Part III examines the need for reform in
light of the substantial confusion amongst the lower courts and the
government's increased reliance upon the privilege. Part IV
demonstrates why proposed and extant internal administrative
mechanisms are insufficient to prevent future misapplications of
the privilege and why Congress is uniquely poised to offer

F. Supp. 2d 899, 920 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (holding that dismissal of litigants'
complaint alleging that a telephone company violated the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act was proper because the litigants could not prove
real or immediate threat of immediate or repeated injury without disclosures
by the defendant which were prohibited by the privilege).
13. In recognizing the privilege, at least one court has cited great deference
to the President's Article II authority. El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 312 ("But we
would be guilty of excess . .. if we were to disregard settled legal principles in
order to reach the merits of an executive action that would not otherwise be
before us-especially when the challenged action pertains to military or
foreign policy.").
14. Accordingly, one authority on the privilege has recognized that the
privilege has become "the subject of considerable uncertainty." Robert M.
Chesney, State Secrets and the Limits of National Security Litigation, 75 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1249, 1270 (2007).
15. Compare Frost, supra note 10, at 1958-62 (suggesting that courts
should request Congress to decide the legal question if the state secrets
privilege renders the dispute unresolvable in a judicial forum), and J. Steven
Gardner, The State Secret Privilege Invoked in Civil Litigation:A Proposalfor
Statutory Relief, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 567, 602 (1994) (suggesting a
statutory compensatory scheme for plaintiffs who have claims dismissed or
substantially affected by the privilege's invocation), and Beth George, Note,
An Administrative Law Approach to Reforming the State Secrets Privilege, 84
N.Y.U L. REV. 1691 (2009) (arguing in favor of administrative-law based
reforms over increased judicial scrutiny of the privilege).
16. Two similar versions of the SSPA were previously considered by the
Committee on the Judiciary. State Secrets Protection Act, S. 417, 111th Cong.
(2009); State Secret Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 984, 111th Cong. (2009). The
Senate version was referred to committee but never voted upon while the
House version was reported by committee but never voted upon by the full
House. Substantially identical versions of the SSPA were also considered in
2008. State Secrets Protection Act, S. 2533, 110th Cong. (2008); State Secret
Protection Act of 2008, H.R. 5607, 110th Cong. (2008).
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guidance to the courts. Part V examines the SSPA as an effective
tool which offers necessary procedural guidance to courts
reviewing the privilege's invocation. Part VI applies the SSPA to
an actual case to demonstrate how improved court procedures
would have conserved substantial court resources while
undermining the government's ability to use the privilege as a
means of denying relief to injured litigants. The Article concludes
that without Congressional intervention, the executive's reliance
upon the privilege will likely continue to grow at the expense of
judicial review.
II.

THE PRIVILEGE'S PURPOSE

Although the precise origins of the state secrets privilege in
American jurisprudence are unclear,17 the most important cases
dealing with the privilege have all recognized its common-law
roots.1 8 Subsequent cases' 9 and the Federal Rules of Evidence20
further support common-law limitations to the privilege's
applications. The privilege has historically assumed two forms-as
a narrow bar to actions seeking governmental performance of
secret agreements made pursuant to valid exercises of
governmental power and as a limited evidentiary privilege.
A. Totten's General Principle:No Lawsuits to Enforce Secret
Government Contracts
Although the Court first acknowledged the privilege in dicta
as far back as Chief Justice Marshall's tenure,2 1 Totten v. United
StateS22 demonstrates its potential use as a means of dismissing
specific forms of litigation against the government. At issue in the
case was whether a secret contract for espionage between the
17. See, e.g., Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (citing United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974) as recognizing the privilege's basis in
the President's commander in chief and foreign affairs responsibilities while
citing Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 6 n.9 as recognizing the privilege's basis in the
separation of powers).
18. See, e.g., Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7-8; Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105,
107 (1875); United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 37 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No.
14692d).
19. "The state secrets privilege 'is a common law evidentiary rule that
protects information from discovery when disclosure would be inimical to the
national security."' In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139, 142 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(quoting In re United States, 872 F.2d 472, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
20. "Except as otherwise required by the Constitution or provided by an act
of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, state, or political
subdivision is governed by the principles of the common law as they are
interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and
experience." FED. R. EVID. 501 (emphasis added).
21. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 37.
22. Totten, 92 U.S. 105.
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executive branch and a plaintiff was judicially enforceable. In a
pithy, three-page decision, the Court outlined the "general
principle" which justified the dismissal of the action:
It may be stated as a general principle, that public policy forbids the
maintenance of any suit in a court of justice, the trial of which
would inevitably lead to the disclosure of matters which the law
itself regards as confidential, and respecting which it will not allow
23
the confidence to be violated.
Although this principle has been cited by numerous courts as
a basis for categorically barring actions that might disclose a wide
range of governmental secrets, several distinguishing features of
the case limit the intent of this "general principle." First, the
Court explicitly recognized that the need for secrecy was
predicated on a valid exercise of Executive authority:
We have no difficulty as to the authority of the President in the
matter. He was undoubtedly authorized during the war, as
commander-in-chief of the armies of the United States, to employ
secret agents to enter the rebel lines and obtain information
respecting the strength, resources, and movements of the enemy;
and contracts to compensate such agents are so far binding upon the
government as to render it lawful for the President to direct
payment of the amount stipulated out of the contingent fund under
24
his control.
It is doubtful whether the Totten Court could have anticipated
that the dismissal of a case involving Executive authority to form
a contract for espionage would later be used to dismiss suits
alleging torture, kidnapping, or unauthorized wiretaps. Although
the President's ability to form agreements with spies falls squarely
within Article II powers, the very exercise of recently challenged
executive actions stand at the outer parameters of constitutionally
delegated authority.
Second, in its denial of relief, the Court cited the secret
contractual relationship existing between the plaintiff and the
government. Noting the "underst[anding]" that "the lips of the
other [party] were to be for ever [sic] sealed respecting the
relation," the Court held that "the existence of a contract of that
kind is itself a fact not to be disclosed." 25 Plaintiffs who have not
voluntarily entered into secret contractual relations with the
government have not assumed an analogous understanding of
confidentiality and accordingly bear no analogous risk of injury. It
is not difficult to see why the court would intend to limit its threepage decision to plaintiffs seeking enforcement of secret

23. Id. at 107.
24. Id. at 106.
25. Id. at 106-07.
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governmental contracts. 26 The alleged harm resulting from the
government's alleged breach was relatively limited; a denial of
compensation for services rendered. 27 Yet, the government has
since cited Totten's "general principle" as a means of dismissing
actions which allege a wide range of injuries, some of which
constitutes per se violations of constitutional or human rights law.
Guidance is sorely needed to ensure that while establishing a nonjusticiability bar for claims brought by plaintiffs seeking
enforcement of secret governmental contracts, Totten's "general
principle" does not serve as a basis for barring lawsuits from noncontracting parties.
Third, the Court's use of its "general principle" to justify the
dismissal of other lawsuits demonstrates the privilege's descent
from common law rather than the Constitution. The Court
explicitly reasoned that similar motivations guided other forms of
common-law evidentiary privileges. "On this principle, suits
cannot be maintained which would require a disclosure of the
confidence of the confessional, or those between husband and wife,
or of communications by a client to his counsel for professional
advice, or a patient to his physician for a similar purpose." 28 Thus,
the very case which first recognized the privilege's most expansive
form was careful to justify the dismissal of lawsuits as a necessary
consequence of a limited evidentiary privilege rather than
Constitutional doctrine.
B. Reynolds: An Outdated and Ineffective Benchmark
The Supreme Court's leading case on the privilege, United
States v. Reynolds, 29 confirms the privilege as a limited
evidentiary restriction to be used sparingly rather than a
frequently-cited doctrine of wholesale executive immunity, but
establishes inadequate procedures and guidance for assessing its
use. In the case, the spouses of three civilians who had perished in
a B-29 airplane accident filed a wrongful death action against the
government under the Torts Claim Act.30 In response to the
plaintiffs' discovery requests for the results of an official accident
26. The Supreme Court has reaffirmed the application of Totten's "general
principle" to suits involving covert espionage agreements. Tenet v. Doe, 544
U.S. 1, 3 (2005). Furthermore, in the most recent case involving the privilege,
the Supreme Court has distinguished its authority for resolving disputes
involving contractual arrangements implicating alleged governmental secrets
from other disputes involving alleged governmental secrets. In the former, the
Court relies upon its "common-law authority to fashion contractual remedies
in Government-contracting disputes" and "not [its] power to determine the
procedural rules of evidence. . . ." Gen. Dynamics Corp., 131 S. Ct. at 1906.
27. Totten, 92 U.S. at 105.
28. Id. at 107.
29. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1.
30. Id. at 2-3.
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report conducted by the Air Force, the Secretary of the Air Force
filed a formal Claim of Privilege to oppose this request "for the
reason that the aircraft in question, together with the personnel
on board, were engaged in a highly secret mission of the Air
Force."31 Specifically, the government alleged that the plane was
being flown for the purposes of testing secret electronic equipment
at the time of the crash.32 Although the Court acknowledged a
"reasonable danger" 33 that the accident report contained
references to the secret equipment, the Court nonetheless denied
the government's request to dismiss the case. Noting that "[t]here
is nothing to suggest that the electronic equipment, in this case,
had any causal connection with the accident" 34 and that it "should
be possible for respondents to adduce the essential facts as to
causation without resort to material touching upon military
secrets" 35 by examining surviving crew members, the Court
permitted the case to continue while denying the plaintiffs access
to the allegedly privileged information. 36 Notwithstanding the
Court's unwillingness to grant complete dismissal of the case, the
infamous subsequent history of the case in which the contested
documents were declassified revealing the negligence of the B-29
crew members but no references to secret equipment, is
illustrative of the privilege's potential perils. 37
The Reynolds Court established the judiciary's important role
as an independent evaluator of the Executive branch's assertion of
the privilege. Even in the face of a governmental invocation of the
privilege, the Court sought to sustain the litigation through an
"available alternative," 38 which would not compromise state
secrets. The Court noted that "[j]udicial control over the evidence
in a case cannot be abdicated to the caprice of executive
officers." 39 Further, the Court stated that "[the privilege] is not to
be lightly invoked." 40
Although the Court provided clear procedural guidance to the
government for the proper invocation of the privilege, 4 1 it gave trial
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 4.
Id. at 10.
Id.
Id. at 11.

35. Id.

36. Id. at 12.
37. See generally UNITED STATES AIRFORCE, FLYING SAFETY DIVISION,
SUMMARY OF B-29 AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT, AFCAl-4G, available at http://www

.fas.org/sgp/othergov/reynoldspetapp.pdf. An attempt to overturn the earlier
settlement on the basis of the government's mischaracterization of the report's
contents was denied. See In re Herring, 539 U.S. 940 (2003) (denying writ of
error coram nobis).
38. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11.
39. Id. at 9-10.
40. Id. at 7.
41. "There must be a formal claim of privilege, lodged by the head of the
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courts scant substantive benchmarks for independently evaluating
the merit of such claims. Provided that the trial judge determines
there is "a reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will
expose military matters which, in the interest of national security,
should not be divulged,"42 the Court found that a judge was not
required to personally examine the allegedly privileged
information. 43 In determining how far courts must probe to
determine if the asserted privilege is valid, the Court said that
judges should examine the strength of the government's claim that
the information is necessary for the litigation to proceed. "Where
there is a strong showing of necessity, the claim of privilege should
not be lightly accepted, but even the most compelling necessity
cannot overcome the claim of privilege if the court is ultimately
satisfied that military secrets are at stake."44
In the fifty-seven years since the Supreme Court first
recognized the existence of a governmental privilege which could
theoretically bar the justiciability of every civil case against the
government, it has refrained from further clarifying the process
and standards by which courts must assess its invocation. The
Court's ambiguously-worded "reasonable danger" test has served
as a justification for the complete termination of litigation without
even a review of the allegedly secret evidence. 45
C. Ellsberg: Policy Concerns to Inform ProceduralGuidance
A subsequent judgment issued by the District of Columbia
Circuit Court demonstrates why-within the context of the
privilege-"whenever possible, sensitive information must be
disentangled from nonsensitive information to allow for the
release of the latter."46 In Ellsberg v. Mitchell,47 a group of
defendants and their attorneys in the "Pentagon Papers" criminal
prosecution asserted that they were the subjects of warrantless
wiretaps conducted by the government. Although the district court
dismissed their case without providing the plaintiffs an
opportunity to contest the governmental claim that litigation
department which has control over the matter, after actual personal
consideration by that officer." Id. at 7-8 (footnotes omitted).
42. Id. at 10.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 11.
45. See, e.g., Sterling v. Tenet, 416 F.3d 338, 344 (4th Cir. 2005)
(determining that in camera review of the evidence is not required on the basis
of affidavits or declarations from the government); Black v. United States, 62
F.3d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir. 1995) (affirming dismissal only on the basis of
governmental declarations alleging the privilege); Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d
1159, 1170 (9th Cir. 1998) (affirming dismissal on state secrets grounds when
only considering governmental declarations).
46. Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
47. Ellsberg, 709 F.2d 51.
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would disclose state secrets, the judgment was reversed on
appeal. In the absence of the government's explanation of how the
identities of the attorneys general who authorized the wiretaps
was related to "national security," the circuit court held that a
48
complete dismissal of the case was unjustified.
In its articulation of the proper procedural protocol to follow
when reviewing the government's assertion of the privilege, the
circuit court noted the "absence of controlling precedent" and
considered "judicial experience in related fields . . . ."49 Like the
Totten Court, the circuit court looked to other limited evidentiary
privileges in its analysis of the privilege. To determine the proper
procedure for handling an assertion of state secrets, the Ellsberg
Court noted the procedural requirements of the "law enforcement
evidentiary privilege," which required that the government
submit:
[A]n index correlating indexed items with particular claims of
privilege .. . [along with] an analysis containing descriptions
specific enough to identify the basis of the particular claim or
claims. After the plaintiff had been afforded an opportunity to see
this analysis and take issue with its conclusions, the court could
examine the materials themselves in camera and make its final
50
determination.
The Court described the practical benefits of procedures
favoring transparency and debate between the government and
the plaintiff in the face of the asserted privilege:
The more specific the public explanation, the greater the ability of
the opposing party to contest it. The ensuing arguments assist the
judge in assessing the risk of harm posed by dissemination of the
information in question. This kind of focused debate is of particular
aid to the judge when fulfilling his duty to disentangle privileged
from non-privileged materials-to ensure that no more is shielded
than is necessary to avoid the anticipated injuries.5 1
If the district court had provided the plaintiffs an opportunity
for a "public debate over the basis and scope of a privilege claim"
prior to the in camera proceedings and "an opportunity to contest a
detailed justification for the government's claim," it would have
avoided the need for an appeal, thereby saving "considerable time
and resources." 52 The Ellsberg Court conceded that such close
scrutiny of governmental claims was "partially offset" by two
opposing considerations: the need to not disclose "the very thing
the privilege is designed to protect" and the desire to not constrain

48. Id. at 60.
49. Id. at 62.

50. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
51. Id. at 63.
52. Id.
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district courts in designing appropriate procedures for specific
cases. 53 After discussing the underlying policy concerns, the court
articulated procedural guidance for trial courts confronted with
the government's invocation of the privilege:
[Tihe trial judge should insist (1) that the formal claim of privilege
be made on the public record and (2) that the government either (a)
publicly explain in detail the kinds of injury to national security it
seeks to avoid and the reason those harms would result from
revelation of the requested information or (b) indicate why such an
explanation would itself endanger national security. 54
Ellsberg's value lies not just in its useful procedural guidance
for courts "in the absence of controlling precedent," but in its
distillation of the essential policy concerns that should inform a
court's consideration of the defense. According to the Ellsberg
Court, a judge errs not by deferring to the government's claim of
the privilege, but instead by doing so in a fashion that precludes
any meaningful way for the plaintiff to contest its necessity.
Without procedural rules which favor open debate and ensure for
detailed governmental explanations linking the privilege to each
piece of allegedly secret evidence, courts run the substantial risk of
denying justice to deserving plaintiffs, wasting valuable judicial
resources and unnecessarily consuming the time of both plaintiff
and defendant. To avoid such serious foreclosures of justice and
"needless delay in the prosecution of the suit,"55 the court should
consider and import applicable court procedure from analogous
evidentiary privileges.
III.

CONFUSION WITHIN THE LOWER COURTS HAS RESULTED IN
DRAmATIC ExPANSION OF THE PRIVILEGE IN
RECENT YEARS

Notwithstanding the Ellsberg Court's recognition of the
policies that should inform court procedures to handle the
privilege, subsequent disagreement among the lower courts has
resulted in profound inconsistencies over the most elementary of
procedural matters. One notable source of disagreement is
whether a court may properly dismiss an entire cause of action
based on the government's invocation of the privilege at the
pleading stage without allowing the plaintiff an opportunity to
state a cause of action absent the allegedly secret information.
Some courts have cited the privilege as a basis for dismissing
claims at the onset of litigation,56 while others have explicitly

53. Id.
54. Id. at 63-64.
55. Id. at 63.
56. See El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 306, 311 (dismissing suit alleging torture and
wrongful detention at pleading stage); Zuckerbraun v. Gen. Dynamics Corp.,
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refused to do so. 5 7 Another constant source of confusion is whether
Reynolds's incarnation of the privilege bars the disclosure of the
evidence or-like other forms of evidentiary privileges 58-still
permits a litigant to demonstrate the veracity of factual
information contained within the privileged evidence through nonprivileged evidence. The lack of clarity has caused unpredictable
results and confusion amongst litigants, and resulted in the very
waste of resources and time that Ellsberg sought to avoid.
The lack of consensus among the lower courts has resulted in
more aggressive uses for a limited evidentiary privilege. Despite
its historically limited use, the government's reliance upon the
privilege has expanded dramatically in recent years,
demonstrating the potential for abuse and the need for attentive
judicial scrutiny. The new use for the privilege began with novel
legal arguments that highlighted a purported constitutional basis
instead of a common-law foundation. Under the Bush
Administration, Department of Justice lawyers offered a
constitutional basis for why the dismissal of cases which implicate
a state secret was appropriate at the pleading stage.5 9 The
justification, which cited the need for presidential autonomy in
handling foreign and military affairs, was accepted by the court.6 0
Under the Obama administration, Department of Justice lawyers
have continued to advance the previous administration's theory for
the privilege's constitutional basis 61 notwithstanding the judicial
935 F.2d 544, 547 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting Totten's applicability to a suit
involving a secret weapons system rendered discovery "a waste of time and
resources."); Bareford v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 973 F.2d 1138, 1144 (5th Cir.
1992) (holding that a case which "would inevitably lead to a significant risk" of
a state secret must be dismissed at pleading stage).
57. See DTM Research, L.L.C. v. AT&T Corp., 245 F.3d 327, 334 (4th Cir.
2001) ("[I]n the proper case, a court, using 'creativity and care,' could devise
'procedures which [would] protect the privilege and yet allow the merits of the
controversy to be decided in some form."') (citation omitted); Hepting v. AT&T
Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 994 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (citing the approach of the
courts in Halkin and Ellsberg as a basis for not dismissing a case "at the
outset but allow[ing] them to proceed to discovery sufficiently to assess the
state secrets privilege in light of the facts.").
58. For example, a claim which can only be proven by disclosing a
conversation which is protected under the attorney client privilege is obviously
barred as non-justiciable. However, a court does not bar the introduction of
otherwise admissible evidence merely because it was also the topic of
discussion between an attorney and a client. Such an expansive interpretation
of the attorney client privilege would render nearly every claim nonjusticiable.
59. See El-Masri,479 F.3d at 303-04.
60. Id. at 303 ("Although the state secrets privilege was developed at
common law, it performs a function of constitutional significance, because it
allows the executive branch to protect information whose secrecy is necessary
to its military and foreign-affairs responsibilities.").
61. Government Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss
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branch's countervailing constitutional responsibility to adjudicate
disputes.62
In addition to advancing powerful new arguments on behalf of
the privilege, one commentator has found that the Bush
administration invoked the privilege in twenty-eight percent more
cases per year than in the previous decade.63 The Obama
administration continues to assert the privilege at a historically
high rate, 64 standardizing the use of a previously rarely-invoked
defense. Even when advancing alternative legal defenses and
recognizing that the privilege should be invoked no more often or
extensively than necessary, Department of Justice lawyers have
liberally cited the privilege as a safe-guard basis for dismissing
claims. 65 More recently, the government has argued that it may
even invoke the privilege in a civil suit against a defendant when
doing so deprives the defendant of an otherwise valid legal
defense.66
Critics offer insufficient counterarguments for why the
government's increased reliance upon the privilege does not
demonstrate a need to curb its use. One has argued that the
government's increased reliance upon the privilege is without
meaning because "the rate of assertion of the privilege relative to
the amount of litigation implicating classified national security
programs is little changed."67 But this is simply a restatement of
the problem. While it is reasonable to anticipate that new threats
posed by terrorists might require greater reliance upon national
and for Summary Judgment at 12 n.9, Jewel v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, No. 08-cv4373-VRW (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2009) ("The privilege has a firm foundation in
the constitutional authority of the President under Article II to protect
national security information.") (citiations omitted).
62. [I]t is important to note that even the state secrets privilege has its
limits. While the court recognizes and respects the executive's
constitutional duty to protect the nation from threats, the court also
takes seriously its constitutional duty to adjudicate the disputes that
come before it.. . . To defer to a blanket assertion of secrecy here would
be to abdicate that duty ....
Hepting, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 995.
63. Frost, supra note 10, at 1939 (relying upon data compiled by Robert M.
Chesney, State Secrets and the Limits of NationalSecurity Litigation, 75 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1249 (2007)).
64. See text accompanying note 11.
65. See Brief for Defendant at 23-30, Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, No. 10-cv-1469
(D.D.C. Oct. 18, 2010) (arguing that, while the privilege need not be reached, it
should nonetheless serve as a basis for dismissal).
66. Brief for the United States, supra note 5, at 39-46.
67. State Secret Protection Act of 2009: Hearing on H.R. 984 Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 69-70 (2009) (testimony of Andrew M.
Grossman) (quoting Chesney, supra note 14, at 1301) [hereinafter State Secret
Protection Act 2009 Hearing], available at http://judiciary.house.gov/heari
ngs/printers/1 11th/1 11-14_50070.pdf.
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security programs, increased alleged harm stemming from covert
governmental action necessarily implicates a growing, not
reduced, need for closer judicial scrutiny of such actions. Another
criticism charges that since cases of the government's misuse of
the privilege are more likely to be appealed and therefore
published than cases in which the government correctly invokes
the privilege, it remains undetermined if the privilege is actually
being misused at an increasing rate.68 For this criticism to be
persuasive, one must assume that plaintiffs appeal every case in
which the privilege is improperly used. But appealing a case
requires significant financial resources and time that not every
deserving litigant has. Finally, it has been argued that the
historical context of a recent "war on terror" necessitates the
government's increased reliance upon the privilege.69 But unlike
other wars, the "war on terror" is likely to endure for many
lifetimes. While the dismissal of claims surrounding an armed
engagement of limited scope and finite duration might be
tolerable, allegations of wrongdoing stemming from governmental
actions of indeterminate scope and indefinite duration raise more
compelling concerns.
It is increasingly common for the government to invoke the
privilege at earlier stages in the litigation and for greater effect.
The Bush administration sought dismissal in ninety-two percent
more cases per year than in the previous decade. 70 The
government has also increasingly invoked the privilege to dismiss
cases before the plaintiff even has an opportunity to request
evidence through discovery.7 1
The government has significantly widened the scope of what
information it claims to be protected as a "state secret." Buttressed
by judicial acquiescence, governmental lawyers have successfully
argued with increasing frequency for the dismissal of cases on the
mere basis that they implicate information which, while harmless

68. Id. at 70.

69. Sean Michael Ward, Comment, The State Secrets ProtectionAct (SSPA):
Statutory Reform of the State Secrets Privilege, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 681,
687 (2009) ("Naturally, the government encountered a higher amount of civil
litigants seeking classified information than during peaceful times.").
70. Frost, supranote 10, at 1939.
71. See Hepting, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 979-80 (explaining how the lower court
prohibited discovery until the government's state secrets privilege claim was
considered); Al-Harmain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 451 F. Supp. 2d. 1215,
1219 (D. Or. 2006) (describing how the government asserted the privilege after
the plaintiffs filed a Motion for Order Compelling Discovery); El-Masri v.
Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 535 (E.D. Va. 2006) (describing how the
government asserted the privilege prior to discovery); Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F.
Supp. 2d 250, 281 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (reasoning that allowing discovery to
proceed in the case would reveal state secrets, which could harm U.S. relations
with Canada).
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in and of itself, could be used as in a mosaic72 to reveal a state
secret.73 When left unchecked, this significantly enlarged
definition may encompass substantial swaths of evidence, leaving
plaintiffs with no legal recourse. The Court's acceptance of "mosaic
theories" is especially problematic in light of Ellsberg's instruction
that "whenever possible, sensitive information must be
disentangled from nonsensitive information to allow for the
release of the latter."74
The privilege has been successfully cited as a defense to
governmental action, which has been widely reported in great
detail by domestic and international media, openly condemned by
foreign governments, and even officially acknowledged by the
President. 75 Although such activities cannot be fairly described as
72. This "mosaic" theory was recognized by the courts in Halkin, 598 F.2d
at 8 ("It requires little reflection to understand that the business of foreign
intelligence gathering in this age of computer technology is more akin to the
construction of a mosaic than it is to the management of a cloak and dagger
affair.").
73. The expanded use for the privilege to defend controversial assertions of
Presidential authority against judicial encroachment bolstered a theorized
"unitary executive branch." According to this theory, the President wielded
complete control over the entire executive branch, thereby precluding any
judicial or congressional interference with department heads. One of the
administration's most outspoken advocates of expansive Presidential powers
under a "unitary executive theory" was John Yoo, an attorney at the Office of
Legal Counsel (OLC), who helped pen the controversial "Torture Memos." Yoo
has attempted to identify a Constitutional argument based on "separation of
powers" underpinning President Jefferson's refusal to turn over documents
subpoenaed by the Supreme Court as requested by Aaron Burr's defense. See
John Yoo, Jefferson and Executive Power, 88 B.U. L. REV. 421, 429 (2008)
(explaining President Jefferson's challenges to the judiciary). Yoo argues that
Jefferson's "success as Chief Executive is closely intertwined with his broad
conception of presidential power." Id. at 425.
74. Ellsberg, 709 F.2d at 57.
75. For example, although the government has repeatedly relied upon the
privilege to dismiss suits alleging torture resulting from American-run
"extraordinary rendition" programs, these programs have been publicly
reported in national media since early 2005. E.g., Jane Mayer, Outsourcing
Torture; The Secret History of America's "ExtraordinaryRendition Program,"
14,
2005,
http://www.newyorker.com/ar
THE NEW YORKER,
Feb.
chive/2005/02/14/050214fa-fact6; Dana Priest, Wrongful Imprisonment:
Anatomy of a CIA Mistake German Citizen Released After Months in
Rendition, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp60 Minutes: CIA
dyn/content/article/2005/12/03/AR2005120301476.html;
Flying Suspects to Torture? (CBS television broadcast Mar. 6, 2005),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/03/04/60minutes/main678155.shtml;
Michael Hirsch, Mark Hosenball & John Barry, Aboard Air CIA, NEWSWEEK,
Feb. 28, 2005, http://www.newsweek.com/2005/02/27/aboard-air-cia.html.
Furthermore, former CIA agents have publicly described the rendition
program in detail. See, e.g., Michael Scheur, Op-Ed, A Fine Rendition, N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/
2005,
11,
Mar.
TIMES,
03/11/opinion/llscheuer.html (providing insight from agent who started and
ran the Al Qaeda detainee/rendition program); Frontline:Interview of Michael
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"secret" various courts have applied the privilege to foreclose
claims arising from these actions. Such protection stands at odds
with Ellsberg's explicit rejection of the government's use of the
privilege when there have already been significant "public
disclosures."76
Lastly, as demonstrated in the next part, recent
administrations have relied upon the privilege to dismiss
allegations of serious wrongdoing arising from executive programs,
which are themselves highly controversial because they stand on
the outer margins of constitutional authority. Most notably, the
privilege has been used to defend a warrantless wiretapping
program,7 7 the use of torture in an extraordinary rendition
2005),
18,
Oct.
broadcast
television
(PBS
Scheur
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages//frontline/torture/interviews/scheuer.html
(explaining how the CIA had already gathered much information about Al
Qaeda by summer, 1998); File on 4: CIA Prisoners 'Tortured' in Arab Jails
2005),
8,
Feb.
broadcast
radio
4
Radio
(BBC
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/file on_4/4246089.stm (confirming that
many terrorism suspects were flown to jails in torture-friendly countries).
Various foreign governments have admitted their complicity in the program
and have even issued public apologies or awards to those harmed by the
program. See Ian Austen, Canada Will Pay $9.75 Million to Man Sent to Syria
http://qu
2007,
27,
Jan.
TIMES,
N.Y.
Tortured,
and
ery.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9CODE2DB173FF934A15752COA9619
C8B63 (monetary compensation to persons injured by Canada's cooperation);
European Parliament Resolution on the Alleged use of European Countries by
the CIA for the Transportation and Illegal Detention of Prisoners
43, T 48, available at http://eur(2006/2200(INI)), 2007 O.J. (C 287E) 309,
lex.europa.eulLexUriServ/site/en/oj/2007/ce287/ce28720071129enO3090333.pdf
("[The European Parliament] [r]egrets that European countries have been
relinquishing their control over their airspace and airports by turning a blind
eye or admitting flights operated by the CIA which, on some occasions, were
being used for extraordinary rendition or the illegal transportation of
detainees . . . ."); UK Apology over Rendition Flights, BBC NEWS, Feb. 21,
2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk news/politics/7256587.stm (statement of
Prime Minister Gordon Brown) ("It is unfortunate that this was not known
and it was unfortunate it happened without us knowing that it had happened
but it's important to put in procedures [to ensure] this will not happen
again."); Sebastian Rotella, Judge in Italy Convicts 23 Americans in 2003 CIA
Kidnapping of Egyptian Cleric, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2009, http://articles.lat
imes.com/2009/nov/05/world/fg-italy-verdict5 (illustrating Italy's rejection of
CIA's rendition of terrorist suspects through the conviction of twenty-three
CIA members involved in "illegal, unacceptable, and unjustified" activities).
Finally, President Obama has acknowledged and discontinued the purported
"secret" detention and interrogation program by Executive Order. See, e.g.,
Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893 (Jan. 22, 2009) ("Ensuring Lawful
Interrogations"); Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 (Jan. 22, 2009)
("Review and Disposition of Individuals Detained at the Guantanamo Bay
Naval Base and Closure of Detention Facilities"); Exec. Order No. 13,493, 74
Fed. Reg. 4901 (Jan. 22, 2009) ("Review of Detention Policy Options").
76. Ellsberg, 709 F.2d at 61.
77. Despite Senator Obama's previous publicized dissatisfaction with a
provision in the 2008 amendments to FISA, which immunized
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program,78 and the creation of assassination lists of American
citizens residing abroad.7 9 These programs are clearly
distinguishable from the President's uncontested power to form a
secret espionage agreement found in Totten.
IV.

CONGRESSIONAL GUIDANCE TO THE COURTS IS WARRANTED
BECAUSE INTERNAL OVERSIGHT OF THE PRIVILEGE OFFERS
No SOLUTION

Clarification on the scope and application of what is properly
viewed as a common-law evidentiary privilege should come from
Congress. Congress's power to regulate the jurisdiction of the
federal courts is found in the Constitution.8 0 The Supreme Court
has confirmed that this power permits Congress to create judicial
rules and regulations relating to evidence and procedure. 8'
Moreover, Congress has previously used this constitutional
authority to enact legislation clarifying specific procedures and
standards for judges to handle and critically evaluate privileged
information. 82
Congressional
to oppose
Possible counterarguments
clarification of an unsettled and confusing area of the law are
unpersuasive. It has been argued that courts are ill-equipped to
evaluate whether divulging information would compromise
national security and that they should therefore simply use
extreme deference to the Executive branch's invocation. 83 This
argument ignores the existing disagreements between various
courts regarding the effect of a properly invoked privilege upon a

telecommunications companies that had participated in the government's
"terrorist surveillance program" (TSP), the government has vigorously called
for the categorical dismissal of previous claims relating to warrantless
surveillance on the basis of a state secrets privilege. See, e.g., Government's
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment,
supra note 61 (praying for the court to dismiss the case because further
proceedings would require the government to disclose privileged information).
78. Mohamed, 563 F.3d at 997.
79. Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 8.
80. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
81. "Congress retains the ultimate authority to modify or set aside any
judicially created rules of evidence and procedure that are not required by the
Constitution." Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000).
82. E.g., Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 50 U.S.C. § 1806(f)
(2006); Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2006);
Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA), 18 U.S.C. app. 3, §§ 1-16 (2000
& Supp. V 2005).
83. See Letter from Michael Mukasey, Att'y Gen., to Sen. Patrick Leahy,
Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary (Mar. 31, 2008), available at
http://www.justice.gov/archive/olalviews-letters/110-2/03-31-08-ag-ltr-re-s2533state-secrets.pdf (arguing that the Judicial Branch would have "neither the
constitutional authority nor the institutional expertise to assume such
functions.").
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case's pleadings. In the absence of any clear guidelines or
precedent demonstrating how courts should evaluate a purported
state secret, confusion has prevailed. Congressionally imposed
guidelines that clearly delineate the proper impact of a properly
invoked privilege upon the pleadings would bring needed
uniformity and order to conflicting judicial tendencies. Such
uniformity would discourage arbitrary and ad hoc determinations,
thereby minimizing the chances that a judge or litigant will
disclose a secret that could jeopardize the security of the country.
Moreover, since the privilege's initial creation, courts have
demonstrated their ability to evaluate and protect information
that could implicate the security of the nation. Provisions within
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)84 and the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)85 have entrusted the courts to
consider highly sensitive information implicating national
security, thereby demonstrating the judiciary's ability to protect
confidential information at the highest levels. Moreover, Congress
has empowered the courts to deny governmental assertions of
privileged information and to create procedures to determine how
classified information may be used in a court through the
Classified Procedures Act (CIPA).86 The success of CIPA is a
testament to federal courts' ability to handle and assess allegedly
confidential information.
Another possible argument against Congressional action is
that such intervention would be recognized as an intrusion into
Executive or Judicial authority and would be accordingly struck
down by the Supreme Court based on past precedent.87 This
argument overlooks both the notable dearth of consistent case law
regarding the privilege's proper relationship to executive powers
and a public invitation for Congressional guidance from a leader of
the judiciary88 and attorneys89 alike.
84. See 50 U.S.C. § 1805 (2006) (empowering judges to evaluate whether
electronic surveillance is necessary for intelligence); 50 U.S.C. § 1806(0
(empowering federal judges to determine, in light of sensitive information
reviewed ex parte, whether surveillance was properly authorized).
85. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) & (b)(1) (2006) (empowering the courts to
determine whether the government has properly classified information as
confidential),
86. 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 4.
87. See State Secret ProtectionAct of 2009 Heaiing,supra note 67, at 56; see
also Letter from Michael Mukasey, supra note 83 (arguing that Congress lacks
the authority "to alter the state secrets privilege, which is rooted in the
Constitution and is not merely a common law privilege.").
88. See State Secret Protection Act of 2009 Hearing, supra note 67, at 21
(testimony of The Honorable Patricia M. Wald, retired Chief Judge, U.S. Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia).
89. See Letter from A.B.A. to Sens. Patrick Leahy and Jeff Session and
Representatives John Conyers, Jr. and Lamar Smith (Oct. 5, 2009), available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/damlaba/migrated/poladv/letters/
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Beth George has argued that the "internal mechanisms"
offered by a "self-contained, heavily administrative paradigm like
the one that governs FISA[" offer the most promising solution to
the privilege's potential future abuses.9 0 However, a closer
examination of FISA's many problems reveals it to be an
undesirable model for resolving issues relating to the privilege.
First, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) has
adopted an extremely deferential inspection of governmental
allegations which is inappropriate for adoption into new legal
contexts. Historical data shows that FISC rarely denies
governmental requests for surveillance. Of the 20,000 applications
for surveillance made to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court (FISC) between 1968 and 1996, the courts have rejected
only twenty-eight. 9 ' Of the 1378 applications to conduct electronic
surveillance and physical searches for foreign intelligence
purposes in 2009, FISC denied just one application in whole and
one in part.92 Although it may be true that "[r]elative to obtaining
a FISA warrant, the government can invoke the state secrets
privilege much more easily,"93 the historical data suggests that
FISA's procedural formalities do not appear to serve as a
substantive check upon executive assertions in constitutionally
controversial areas.
Creating a separate secret court to assess all governmental
assertions of the privilege would also contravene the Ellsberg
Court's explicit disapproval of summarily disposing of a case under
ex parte review after the privilege's invocation. By uniformly
foreclosing the possibility for "public debate over the basis and
scope of a privilege claim" or "an opportunity to contest a detailed
justification for the government's claim," FISA's administrative
paradigm would prematurely deny the very dialogue between
litigants, which the Court recognized to lie at the heart of judicial
efficacy. 94 The adoption of a specialized administrative mechanism
such as FISA would effectively authorize the government to evade
a legal adversary by the mere invocation of an evidentiary
privilege. 95
judiciary/2009oct5_statesecretsi.authcheckdam.pdf (supporting state secret
legislation).
90. George, supra note 15, at 1717.
91. Paul M. Schwartz, German and Telecommunications Privacy Law:
Legal Regulation of Domestic Law Enforcement Surveillance, 54 HASTINGS L.J.
751, 793-94 (2003).
92. OFFICE OF ASSISTANT ATT'Y GEN., FISA ANNUAL REPORT 1 (Apr. 30,
2010), http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/2009rept.pdf.
93. George, supra note 15, at 1719.
94. Ellsberg, 709 F.2d at 63.
95. Apart from denying a plaintiff the ability to counter governmental
assertions, the FISC's ex parte review of wiretaps has been criticized as
wrongfully protecting unconstitutional surveillance. Nola K. Breglio, Note,
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FISA also demonstrates the potential pitfalls of adopting an
administrative procedure, which favors self-policing and secrecy
over the transparent operations of most Article III courts.
Receiving only minimal oversight in the form of infrequent
Congressional hearings and reports, FISC errors are usually
undiscoverable and therefore usually uncorrectable. FISC's only
published opinion was the unsettling admission that it had made
mistakes in seventy-five cases stemming from inaccurate FBI
affidavits.96 Applied to the context of a privilege, which would
foreclose the litigation of violations of international law and the
Constitution, the damages resulting from a secret tribunal's
mistaken application of the privilege are substantial.
Although George argues that the public's participation in
such an administrative legal mechanism would be ensured via the
contributions of experts and lawmakers in a notice-and-comment
type process,9 7 Congress, not an agency, is best equipped to
establish the privilege's parameters through publicized hearings.
In June 2009, the Committee on the Judiciary held a public
hearing in which legal experts interacted directly with politically
accountable lawmakers to discuss the advisability of altering the
privilege's form.98 Public hearings, which provide a record of
detailed cross-examination of experts by politically accountable
leaders, are the proper mechanism for determining what
limitations apply to a privilege that has assumed constitutional
implications. Although notice-and-comment processes are
appropriate for various forms of informal rule making, the size and
shape of a defense which has been used for expansive defenses of a
broad swath of controversial Executive programs should be
publicly approved by members of a rival governmental branchnot delegated to an agency's discretion.
The Department of Justice's Guidelines to constrain the
privilege's use demonstrate why self-policing mechanisms are
inadequate to prevent future misapplications of the privilege.
Notwithstanding President Obama's publicly proclaimed passion
for limiting the privilege's impact9 9 and the potential constraints of
Leaving FISA Behind: The Need to Return to Warrantless Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance, 113 YALE L.J. 179, 188 (2003).

96. See In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 620 (Foreign Intell. Surv. Ct. 2002).

97. George, supra note 15, at 1722 n.156.
98. State Secret ProtectionAct of 2009 Hearing,supra note 67, at 1-3.
99. Id. at 84 (statement of Ben Wizner, Nat'1 Sec. Project Staff Att'y,
ACLU), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/congress/2009/statesec.html ("At a
press conference the day after the Ninth Circuit's ruling in the Jeppesen case,
President Obama was asked about his Administration's position on state
secrets. The President responded, 'I actually think that the state secrets
doctrine should be modified. I think right now it's overbroad. Searching for
ways to redact, to carve out certain cases to see what can be done so that a
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the Guidelines, 00 the government has maintained its reliance
upon expansive invocations of the privilege since the Guidelines
have entered into force.
In fact, mere hours after Attorney General Eric Holder
publicly announced the Guidelines to "ensure the state secrets
privilege is invoked only when necessary and in the narrowest way
possible," 01 the government argued that the risks of exposing
state secrets required the dismissal of a complaint relating to the
use of the warrantless surveillance program.102 It took Attorney
General Holder just one month after the Guidelines went into
effect on October 1, 2009,103 to personally approve 04 the
government's use of the privilege in a similar case involving
warrantless surveillance 0 5 under the new Guidelines.
At best, the Guidelines offer a solution of indefinite duration
and uncertain legal status. Even assuming that the Guidelines
have restrained the government's use of the privilege, there is
ample historical evidence to suggest that, lacking oversight, future
attorneys general will loosen these nonbinding self-restraints. One
note-worthy example is the historical relaxation of strict
guidelines for undercover FBI investigations to protect lawful
judge in chambers can review information without it being in open court-you
know, there should be some additional tools so that it's not such a blunt
instrument."').
100. The Department of Justice is required to periodically explain the
government's use of the privilege to all "appropriate oversight committees of
Congress." Guidelines, supra note 4, at 4. A "State Secrets Review Committee"
consisting of a panel of government lawyers will recommend the privilege's
use. Id. at 2-3. The Attorney General must personally approve every use of the
privilege. Id. at 3. The privilege may not be used to "(i) conceal violations of
the law, inefficiency, or administrative error; (ii) prevent embarrassment to a
person, organization, or agency of the United States government; (iii) restrain
competition; or (iv) prevent or delay the release of information the release of
which would not reasonably be expected to cause significant harm to national
security." Id. at 2.
101. Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Attorney General Establishes New State
Secrets Policies and Procedures (Sept. 23, 2009).
102. Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Uniited States, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 103373, *29-34 (D. Or. Nov. 5, 2009).
103. Guidelines, supra note 4, at 1.
104. "I authorized this significant step following a careful and thorough
review process, and I did so only because I believe there is no way for this case
to move forward without jeopardizing ongoing intelligence activities . . . ." Eric
Holder, Att'y Gen., Statement on Assertion of the State Secrets Privilege in
Shubert v. Obama (Oct. 30th, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/
ag/testimony/2009/ag-testimony-091030.html.
105. See generally Government's Notice of Renewed Motion to Dismiss and
for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support, Shubert v. United
States, 2009 WL 4740741 (Oct. 30, 2009) (motioning for dismissal on the
ground that information necessary to plaintiffs litigation of all claims against
defendants is properly subject to, and excluded from use in this case by, the
state secrets privilege and related statutory privileges).
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First Amendment activities.106
At worst, the new Guidelines simply reiterate that the
Executive branch, and not the judiciary, is empowered to evaluate
which claims may not be adjudicated. The new Guidelines do not
substantially alter or clarify the previously asserted basis for
invoking the privilege. 0 7 Nor do the Guidelines require the
government to provide any supporting evidence to judges who
must decide whether to defer to the invoked privilege. Although at
least one court has lauded the administration's attempt to "set[]
forth a much more detailed structure for the proper invocation of
the state secrets privilege,"108 the Guidelines can offer little
meaningful procedural assistance to a court charged with the
greater task of ensuring the privilege's proper application.
V. THE STATE SECRETS PROTECTION ACT
Having demonstrated why Congress is the appropriate
institution to develop guidelines for courts in assessing claims of
privilege, the previously proposed State Secrets Protection Act' 09
(SSPA) provides needed procedural direction to judges and
litigants who are confronted with the assertion of the privilege. In
general, the SSPA replaces the imprecise and outdated balancing
test articulated in Reynolds nearly half a century ago with a more
concrete framework for evaluating the privilege. As a preliminary
matter, the bill recognizes the need to protect information as vital
to the security of the country and accordingly continues to
empower the judge to allow ex parte submissions according to the
"interests of justice and national security."n 0
Affirming the narrow scope of Totten's applicability to suits
initiated by plaintiffs harmed by covert formal agreements with
the government, the Act explicitly recognizes the privilege's use as
a limited evidentiary privilege instead of a wholly independent
106. See Neil A. Lewis, Traces of Terror: The Inquiry;Ashcroft Permits F.B.I.
to Monitor Internet and Public Activities, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2002,
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/05/31/us/traces-terror-inquiry-asheroft-permitsfbi-monitor-internet-public-activities.html (explaining that restrictions upon
how the FBI searches for information when no formal complaint had been filed
with the Bureau had been relaxed to the extent that counterterrorism
inquiries could be made without approval from headquarters).
107. The privilege will be invoked whenever it is "necessary to protect
information the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected
to cause significant harm to the national defense or foreign relations ('national
security') of the United States." Guidelines, supra note 4, at 1.
108. Horn v. Huddle, 699 F. Supp. 2d 236, 239 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
109. Previously, there were substantially similar versions of this bill in each
branch of Congress; State Secrets Protection Act, S. 417, 111th Cong. (2009) in
the Senate and State Secret Protection Act, H.R. 984, 111th Cong. (2009) in
the House of Representatives. Unless otherwise noted, all references will be to
the Senate's version.
110. S. 417 § 4052(a)(3).
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ground for dismissal of a case or claim.111 Perhaps more
importantly, the SSPA clarifies that the privilege may only be
invoked after discovery, when the evidence is before the court, and
the privilege is necessarily non-generalized and specific. 112 Instead
of permitting judges to accept baseless assertions of the privilege,
which led to the wrongful dismissal in Reynolds, the bill would
require the government to provide a "factual basis" in an affidavit
at the very onset of the case for each piece of allegedly privileged
evidence.1 13 The requirement for such a specific defense is
consistent with Ellsberg's general principle that "whenever
possible, sensitive information must be disentangled from
nonsensitive information to allow for the release of the latter."114
Even if the court determines that the specific evidence is secret,
the court must try to use an evidentiary substitute whenever
possible.115

As a retired Chief Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals has
observed, the government has inconsistently objected to court
techniques for determining whether cases may proceed without
threatening national security." 6 If enacted, the bill would
consequently minimize governmental appeals by explicitly
authorizing courts to use specific techniques such as sampling,117
the use of indexes,"18 the appointment of "special masters,"" 9 and
in the House version of the bill, an "adequate substitute, such as a
redacted version, summary of the information, or stipulation
regarding the relevant facts, if the court deems such a substitute
feasible"120 to allow cases to proceed. Fewer governmental appeals
based on legally sanctioned sampling techniques would likely
result in the conservation of "considerable time and resources"recognized by the Ellsberg Court as an important policy
consideration when reviewing the privilege.121 These techniques
for evaluating allegedly secret, privileged, or voluminous material
are already being used by federal judges in other contexts and will
offer welcome assistance in a confused area of law.
Adding to the bill's appeal, the SSPA has attracted supporters
under both republican and democratic presidents and will
therefore be relatively immune to charges of political
111. Id. at § 4053(b).
112. Id. at § 4054(d)(e).
113. Id. at § 4053(d).
114. Ellsberg, 709 F.2d at 57.
115. S. 417 § 4054(f).
116. State Secret Protection Act of 2009 Hearing, supra note 67, at 21
(testimony of the Hon. Patricia M. Wald).
117. S. 417 § 4054(d)(2).

118. Id. at § 4054(d).
119. Id. at § 4052(f).
120. H.R. 984 § 3(d).
121. Ellsberg, 709 F.2d at 63.
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motivations.122 Unconstrained by FISA's financial burdens for
maintaining special tribunals to evaluate secret information, the
SSPA could be enacted at little cost. The Congressional Budget
Office estimated that implementing H.R. 984 would have "no
significant impact on the federal budget." 123
The optimal levels of deference that judges should pay to
government experts who assert the privilege remains an
important point of difference between the House and Senate
versions of the SSPA. The House's version provides that "[t]he
court shall weigh testimony from Government experts in the same
manner as it does, and along with, any other expert testimony." 24
While the Senate's version contains the same provision, it also
requires that "[t]he court shall give substantial weight to an
assertion by the United States relating to why public disclosure of
an item of evidence would be reasonably likely to cause significant
harm to the national defense or foreign relations of the United
States." 125 This is the approach of the FOIA, which requires that "a
court shall accord substantial weight to an affidavit of an agency
concerning the agency's determination" of the classified nature of
sought-after information. 126 One commentator has argued that the
Senate's version of the SSPA properly recognizes the
constitutional deference owed to an executive branch. Although it
is true that the Executive branch wields both expertise in matters
of national security and constitutional responsibilities to protect
the country, which must be respected by other branches, it is likely
that the "substantial weight" requirement would likely prove to be
a source of further ambiguity and confusion, thereby depriving the
SSPA of its broader intent to clearly establish the judiciary's role
as a critical evaluator of the privilege. Noting the importance of
instituting a "meaningful review," former Chief Judge of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, Patricia C. Wald,
has argued persuasively that the Senate's version "would unfairly
tip the scales in favor of executive branch claims before the judge's
evaluation occurs, and would undermine the thoroughness of the
judge's own review."127

122. Although the State Secrets Protection Act, S. 2533, 110th Cong.
(2008), was originally proposed during the tenure of President Bush, it was
proposed a second time under President Obama.
123. Congressional Budget Office, Cost Estimate for H.R. 984, 111th Cong.
(2009).
124. H.R. 984 § 6(c).
125. S. 417 § 4054(e)(3) (emphasis added).
126. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.S. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2006).
127. State Secret Protection Act of 2009 Hearing, supra note 67, at 33
(statement of the Hon. Patricia M. Wald).
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APPLICATION OF THE SSPA TO JEPPESEN DEMONSTRATES ITS
UTILITY IN CONSERVING VALUABLE JUDICIAL RESOURCES

A hypothetical application of the SSPA to a recent case in
which the government asserted the privilege to dismiss allegations
against a third party for knowingly participating in a torture
program is a case demonstration of how the statute could provide
needed procedural guidance to courts to ensure for more efficient
and fair adjudication of claims.
In 2007, Ethiopian national and British citizen Binyam
Mohamed and four others filed a claim under the Alien Tort
Statute against Jeppesen Dataplan Incorporated, a subsidiary of
Boeing and contractor for the government. Mohamed alleged that,
after CIA operatives apprehended him in Pakistan in 2002,
Jeppesen knowingly12 8 transported him to and from various
locations where he was tortured 29 before his eventual release in
2009. The government intervened on behalf of Jeppesen and
invoked the state secrets privilege at the pleadings stage,
demanding that the entire case be dismissed. The District Court
for the Northern District of California held that the suit must be
dismissed pre-discovery, because its very subject matter concerned
a state secret. "In sum, at the core of plaintiffs' case against
Defendant Jeppesen are 'allegations' of covert U.S. military or CIA
operations in foreign countries against foreign nationals-clearly a
subject matter which is a state secret." 130
The ensuing history of the case demonstrates both the
insufficiency of the Guidelines to restrain future misuses of the
privilege and the substantial inefficiencies resulting from
confusion surrounding the privilege's proper scope. Just a few
months after a newly-elected President Obama pledged to
introduce a new era of accountability and transparency to the
White House, Department of Justice attorneys again asserted the
state secrets privilege to preclude the appeal of the district court's
decision. A three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
reaffirmed Totten's limited applicability to cases involving secret
128. "A former Jeppesen employee informed THE NEW YORKER that at an
internal company meeting, a senior Jeppesen official stated: 'We do all of the
extraordinary rendition flights-you know, the torture flights. Let's face it,
some of these flights end up that way."' Jane Mayer, The C.LA.'s Travel Agent,
THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 30, 2006, at 34.
129. The horrific nature of the alleged torture, if true, surely constitutes a
violation of jus cogens. "Mr. Mohamed was handed over to agents of the
Moroccan security services. Over the next 18 months, he was routinely beaten
to the point of losing consciousness, and a scalpel was used to make incisions
all over his body, including his penis, after which a hot stinging liquid was
poured into his open wounds." Appellate Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 10
Mohamed v. United States, 579 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2009) (No. 10-778).
130. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1136 (N.D.
Cal. 2008).
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agreements existing between the President and the plaintiff,13
and confirmed that the applicable Reynolds standard did not
Rejecting the
require dismissal 32 to reinstate the case. 33
unlimited scope of the government's interpretation of Totten's
general principle, the Ninth Circuit used strong language:
This sweeping characterization of the "very subject matter" bar has
no logical limit-it would apply equally to suits by U.S. citizens, not
just foreign nationals; and to secret conduct committed on U.S. soil,
not just abroad. According to the government's theory, the Judiciary
should effectively cordon off all secret government actions from
judicial scrutiny, immunizing the CIA and its partners from the
demands and limits of the law.13 4
After the Court of Appeals granted the government's petition
for en banc review, Department of Justice attorneys reasserted the
previous administration's arguments for broad judicial deference
to the privilege's invocation with renewed vigor:
No other court of appeals has so restricted the state secrets privilege
and the panel's order is directly at odds with the cardinal principle,
repeatedly applied by courts of appeals, that a case must be
dismissed regardless of its stage if it cannot be litigated further
without disclosure of state secrets.135
In December 2009, just months after Attorney General
Holder's recent Guidelines went into effect, Department of Justice
lawyers maintained the previous governmental position that the
claims against Jeppesen must be dismissed pursuant to the
privilege. In September 2010, the en banc court affirmed the
district court's dismissal by six votes to five because there was "no
feasible way to litigate Jeppesen's alleged liability without
creating an unjustifiable risk of divulging state secrets."" 6 In
reaching this determination, the Ninth Circuit "assume[d] without

131. "On facts similar to those in Totten itself, Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1
(2005), recently confirmed that Totten prohibits only suits that would
necessarily reveal 'the plaintiffs [secret] relationship with the Government.'
Id. at 10 (emphasis added)." Mohamed, 563 F.3d at 1002.
132. "Successful invocation of the Reynolds privilege does not necessarily
require dismissal of the entire suit. Instead, invocation of the privilege
requires 'simply that the evidence is unavailable, as though a witness
had died [or a document had been destroyed], and the case will proceed
accordingly, with no consequences save those resulting from the loss of
evidence.'
Al-Haramain, 507 F.3d at 1204 (quoting Ellsberg, 709 F.2d at 64)." Mohamed,
563 F.3d at 1001.
133. Id. at 997.
134. Id. at 1003.
135. Brief of Intervenor-Appellee at 3, Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc.,
No. 08-15693 (9th Cir. June 12, 2009).
136. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1087 (9th Cir.
2010) (en banc).
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deciding that plaintiffs' prima facie case and Jeppesen's defenses
may not inevitably depend on privileged evidence."137
Applied to the case, the SSPA would have saved considerable
time and resources by requiring the district court to engage in its
primary responsibilities as fact-finder. Under the current formula,
appellate courts must pour through voluminous court records
which have been ignored by the lower court based on the
successful assertion of the privilege. After the district court's
recognition of the privilege, thirty Ninth Circuit judges have
reviewed the nearly 2000 pages of public material evidence
submitted by the plaintiff.13 8 Although it was better positioned to
do so, the district court could not examine the plaintiffs evidence,
because it had deferred to the government's pre-discovery
invocation of the privilege. The SSPA would prohibit the factfinder's deference to abstract assertions of the privilege before the
plaintiff has been permitted to engage in discovery or demonstrate
why the evidence is not secret. Consequently, instead of deferring
to a hypothetical governmental assertion that litigation would
compromise secrets, a lower court operating under SSPA
procedures would have been required to make a factual
determination whether the specific evidence actually required by
the plaintiff was secret. Second, applying the standard of review of
SSPA, the government would have been required to provide a
"factual basis" in an affidavit for the claim of privilege for each
piece of allegedly privileged evidence at the onset of the case. Such
affidavits would ground governmental assertions in specific
evidence, minimizing the chances that a district court's deference
to the privilege's assertion would be generalized, inaccurate, and
appealable. At the very least, the fact-finder's piecemeal inspection
of such affidavits and the evidence before the court would have
courts the time-consuming
saved subsequent appellate
of evidence.
of
extensive
amounts
examinations
SSPA
procedures,
the district court could not
Secondly, under
general
principle
as
a
basis for foreclosing relief
have used Totten's
governmental
sustained
through
a
well-documented
from, injuries
program. First, the SSPA clearly prohibits the government from
invoking the privilege as "grounds for dismissal of a case or
claim." 39 However, putting this issue aside, if the district court
had actually examined the specific evidence, it could have
concluded that much of the allegedly confidential information had
already been publicly disclosed through extensive media coverage
and government officials' public descriptions of the renditions
program. 140 Under the procedural guidance of House Resolution
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1095 n.2 (Hawkins, J., dissenting).

139. S. 417 § 4053(b).
140. See supra text accompanying note 69. In addition to the media
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984, which permitted the court to weigh testimony from "other
expert testimony" in the same fashion as it does "government
experts," the court could have determined that public disclosures
rendered the information beyond the privilege's protections.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Although controversies involving the state secrets privilege
have assumed constitutional overtones, the government's ability to
foreclose the admission of evidence based on secrecy is essentially
derived from the common law, and should be limited accordingly.
Guidance from Congress is appropriate to ensure that "whenever
possible, sensitive information must be disentangled from
141
nonsensitive information to allow for the release of the latter."
In its current form, judges are left alone to navigate the uncertain
procedural complexities posed by the privilege's invocation.
Without any systematic direction, judges have exhibited great
deference to governmental assertions at early stages of litigation.
But this deference has also bred inconsistencies and confusion,
unnecessarily increasing litigation and demanding greater and
greater allocations of court resources. Procedural guidance for
judges who must define the privilege's scope will bring needed
clarity to an ambiguous area of law, limit miscarriages of justice,
ensure for uniform standards to protect the nation's most sensitive
information, and minimize judicial inefficiencies.

attention, two foreign governments have already compensated three of the
petitioners for the role they played in their torture and renditions. The British
government plans on conducting its own inquiry into the role of the British
government's cooperation with the CIA and other foreign organizations in the
torture of suspected terrorists. See lan Cobain, David Cameron Announces
Torture Inquiry, THE GUARDIAN (LONDON), July 6, 2010 (noting general
inquiry into Britain's role in torture and rendition).
141. Ellsberg, 709 F.2d at 57.

